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The objective of embedding technology on board ships, to improve safety, is not fully accomplished. 
The paper studies marine accidents caused by human error resulting from improper human-tech-
nology interaction. The aim of the paper is to propose measures to prevent reoccurrence of such 
accidents. This study analyses the marine accident reports issued by Marine Accidents Investigation 
Branch covering the period from 2012 to 2014. The factors that caused these accidents are examined 
and categorised. Analysis shows that 31% of the marine accidents are associated with technology. 
Poorly designed and/or inadequately trained-for ship systems, as well as changes in job perform-
ance requirements and attitudes towards practices and procedures influenced by technology de-
feated a safety system, contributed to the occurrence of a human error and lead to accidents. The 
user-centred design and improvements in training and organisation of the ship’s crew are proposed 
as preventive measures. This study underpins the importance of effective teamwork in the effort to 
improve safety on board ships.
1 Introduction
Fast technology development has strongly influenced 
maritime transport. In order to reduce the risk of acci-
dents, simplify handling of vessel’s systems and increase 
efficiency in marine traffic, automated systems such as 
Integrated Bridge System, IBS, Integrated Navigation 
System, INS, Central Alert Management Human Machine 
Interface, CAM-HMI, Electronic Chart Display Integrated 
System, ECDIS, have been introduced.
However, in contrary to the widespread opinion that 
increased level of automation means more safety, technol-
ogy can contribute to the occurrence of accidents caused 
by human error and hence defeat the purpose for which it 
was introduced (Lutzhoft and Dekker 2002). An increase 
of automation level accompanied by reducing manning 
level could conduce to increased cognitive demands re-
sulting from the necessity to establish and maintain the 
mode awareness, the ability of a supervisor to track and 
to anticipate the behaviour of automated systems (Sarter 
and Woods 1995). The increased capabilities and the 
high level of autonomy of automated systems present a 
challenge for monitoring, integrating and interpreting in-
formation provided by automation. Additional problem 
comes from the difficulty of keeping track of the numer-
ous systems simultaneously, particularly in cases when 
observability is hampered by poorly designed displays 
and weak feedback. In these cases detriment in perform-
ance on one task could occur, resulting in potentially dan-
gerous situations (Hetherington et al. 2006). Complete 
understanding and working knowledge of functions and 
options provided by automation for carrying out tasks 
under various conditions, especially in unusual or emer-
gency situations, are required in order to avoid dysfunc-
tional interaction between operator and technology. On 
the other hand, a perception of technology as fully reliable 
and trustful, can lead to underestimating risks and conse-
quently to the change of attitude toward seamanship prac-
tices and procedures, thus enabling occurrence of human 
error (Schröder –Hinrichs et al. 2012).
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Human error causes between 80 and 90% of maritime 
accidents (Ugurlu et al. 2015). An analysis of 100 acci-
dents at sea showed that a large proportion of casualties 
are caused by multiple errors made by multiple people 
(Wagenaar and Groeneweg 1987). Furthermore, it was 
demonstrated that each human error that was made was 
essential for the accident to happen; in other words, if any 
of those errors in the chain of events was prevented, ac-
cident would not happen. Therefore, examining the role of 
the human element is the central issue in improving mari-
time safety. 
In this study, we have analysed 55 accidents that oc-
curred from 2012 to 2014 as reported by MAIB1 (MAIB 
2012; MAIB 2013, MAIB 2014). According to our review 
causes of 31% of the analysed accidents are associated 
with technology. To determine preventive measures, it 
is important to identify the error-inducing conditions. 
Therefore, safety issues related to technology are dis-
cussed and examples where they directly contributed to 
the accident are provided to illustrate the most significant 
impacts on the occurrence of human error. Some recom-
mendations for fostering safety culture are developed. A 
closer look at the question of improving the organization 
of the ship’s crew, as an important preventive measure, is 
taken. 
2 Inadequate equipment design 
A comprehensive understanding of the working en-
vironment on board is necessary to design equipment 
that fit the actual needs of seafarers under all conditions. 
Otherwise, the design of technology can present a chal-
lenge for working safely and efficiently. For example, 
layout of workspaces and arrangement of controls and 
displays may be inadequate or brightness and loudness of 
important alarms and displays may not be enough to warn 
the operator about important changes, such as automatic 
or inadvertent mode transition. In 8 out of 55 analyzed ac-
cidents, one of the main contributing factors was a poor 
equipment design.
To illustrate an impact of poor design on human per-
formance, several examples are provided. Control console 
ergonomics was one of the factors contributing to heavy 
contact of ferry Sirena Seaways with the berth at Harwich 
(MAIB 2014a). The master and officer of the watch were 
not in full command of the vessel’s propulsion system, 
partly due to the layout of the propulsion control con-
soles. Two buttons on the bridge central console were po-
sitioned closely, and one of them, starboard controllable 
pitch propeller (CPP) back-up control button, not fitted 
with a protective cover, was most likely pressed inadvert-
ently together with ‘lights up’ button. Unaware of the fact 
that the back-up control system is activated, the master 
thought that he transferred full control of the vessel to 
the port bridge wing. The transfer of the combinator le-
1  MAIB – Marine Accidents Investigation Branch
ver control between consoles was confirmed by ‘in-com-
mand’ lamp. However, combinator levers had not control 
of the CPP, because once activated, the back-up control 
systems` commands overrode those from the combinator 
levers. The facts that ‘in-command’ lamp was lit regardless 
whether the back-up control system was active and that 
was hard to see the glow of the back-up control lamp on 
the bridge wing console enabled misunderstanding over 
which the system had control. 
The importance of designing equipment considering 
under what circumstances it could be used is illustrated 
by the case when the master was not able to warn the pas-
sengers and crew of the impending contact of the vessel 
Millennium Diamond with the London Tower Bridge (MAIB 
2015). The mate, who was at the helm, became distracted 
while replaying an unexpected VHF message from London 
VTS about the closure of the Tower Pier, the vessel’s desti-
nation. The mate was not able to maintain a proper lookout 
and monitor the rudder angle indicators while operating 
the VHF set due to the layout of wheelhouse equipment 
and he did not notice that the vessel was heading towards 
the south pier of the Tower Bridge. Immediately before 
the vessel struck the bridge, the master used the public 
address (PA) microphone in an attempt to instruct the 
passengers to sit down and brace themselves. However, 
ergonomic deficiencies of the arrangement and settings of 
the PA system, which were not significant during routine 
operation of the vessel, became crucial in emergency situ-
ation because they disabled broadcasting of the master’s 
message. Namely, the PA system was set to the river guide 
mode and activating the microphone did not automatically 
take priority over pre-recorded broadcasts. In a situation 
of an inevitable contact, the master forgot to change the 
selector switch before approaching the microphone. Later, 
when he was standing by the microphone, located on the 
starboard, he could not reach the selector switch, located 
on the port side. 
On the other hand, ergonomically efficient bridge de-
sign was one of the contributing factors to the grounding 
of the general cargo vessel Fri Ocean due to the unaccom-
panied officer on the watch who felt asleep (MAIB 2013b). 
The bridge layout was designed to enable a watchkeeper 
to monitor the vessel’s position and adjust the vessel’s 
course while seated in the port bridge chair. An opportu-
nity to conduct much of the watch sitting down increased 
the potential for a fatigued officer to fall asleep. 
3 Poor knowledge of own ship systems
Maritime education and training must enable the crew 
members to use equipment properly under various and 
changing conditions. An operator must have an adequate 
knowledge on the device operation, its abilities and limi-
tations in order to avoid mishaps. However, new, more 
complex automated systems are constantly introduced on 
board vessels and it is difficult for a seafarer to keep pace 
with rapid changes. Additionally, equipment design is not 
standardized, and it can differ even on board vessels op-
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erated by the same company. For example, over 30 differ-
ent designs of the interface user of ECDIS equipment exist 
(MAIB 2014b). The International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) mandates generic ECDIS training, but decision on 
the necessity and form of the type specific training is made 
by Flag States and owners. Therefore, seafarers have of-
ten to familiarize with their own vessel systems and de-
vices, which they have not used before, immediately after 
embarkation. They have to do that as soon as possible, 
simultaneously with familiarization or refreshment with 
company rules and procedures. Furthermore, operating 
manuals are often extensive, sometimes written without 
full insight into user requirements and it could be difficult 
to extract the most important information within a limit-
ed time. Furthermore, there are cases when some equip-
ment is completely renewed but old usage instructions 
and maintenance manuals are not replaced. That can be 
dangerous, especially when the equipment breaks down 
and needs to be repaired quickly for safety reasons. These 
issues contribute to stress and fatigue, factors that cause 
maritime accidents (Berg 2013). 
The introduction of a new technology sometimes re-
quires delivering of a type specific training in a short period 
of time. Therefore, it could be difficult to provide effective 
and sufficient training. Poor knowledge of the own ship sys-
tems contributed to 15% of the analysed accidents. 
A grounding of the oil/chemical tanker Ovit on the 
Varne Bank in the Dover Strait, England, is an example 
of accident caused by an insufficient level of knowledge 
about the ship equipment (MAIB 2014b). Ovit’s primary 
method of navigation was an ECDIS. All of Ovit’s deck of-
ficers had attended a generic ECDIS course and a type 
specific ECDIS training. However, they were not able to 
safely navigate using it. The intended route through the 
Dover Strait, prepared by inexperienced and unsuper-
vised junior officer, contained errors including passing 
directly over an area with shallow waters. The route was 
not properly checked for navigational hazards using the 
ECDIS check-route function. ECDIS safety settings were 
not appropriate. The scale of Electronic Navigation Charts 
in use, selected by the chief officer, was unsuitable for the 
area and the ECDIS ‘auto-load’ feature was switched off. It 
had not been reported that the system’s audible alarm was 
not functioning, indicating that the crew members were 
unaware of the significance of the system’s alarms. The 
accident investigation revealed that ECDIS training under-
taken by the ship’s master was not effective due to the fact 
that it was delivered to ship’s officers of varying ranks and 
experiences. That prevented the ship’s master to reveal his 
lack of knowledge and ask questions. 
4 Complacency
Along with the increased computerization and au-
tomation on board vessels, the role of the seafarer has 
changed considerably, from the main operator in control 
of the systems to more or less passive observer. Since tra-
ditional knowledge and skills are not needed to perform 
passive control actions, there is a possibility of losing such 
knowledge and skills (Bielić et al. 2011). Simultaneously, 
dependence on and trust in technology is growing, giving 
rise to new error sources and risks.
The highly automated systems of modern vessels may 
foster complacency, a feeling of self-satisfaction accom-
panied by a loss of awareness of potential dangers. As a 
result, the operator’s vigilance decreases. A complacent 
behaviour can be manifested as a failure to closely moni-
tor and check instruments, relying on one source of infor-
mation instead utilizing all navigational aids, overlooking 
procedures, resorting to incorrect practices, missing im-
portant signals, misinterpreting signs. Consequently, de-
tection of potentially dangerous situations can be delayed 
or missed. 
One of the factors that may lead to complacent behav-
iour is over reliance on new technology (Parasuraman 
and Manzey 2010). Operators are lulled to thinking that 
the system will not make a mistake, and that it is safe to 
shift alertness to other tasks. This false sense of security 
develops especially if technology has been operating ac-
ceptably for a long period. As a result of the substandard 
monitoring and checking of the technology functionality, 
a malfunction, anomalous condition or failure passes un-
noticed. Furthermore, information provided by technology 
could be trusted completely and not verified by alterna-
tive sources. There are cases where seafarers misinter-
preted or ignored information obtained by visual lookout 
because it differed from those expected and based on au-
tomation (Schager 2008; Schröder-Hinrichs et al. 2012) 
For example, as previously mentioned, the vessel Ovit ap-
proached the Varne Bank, the assigned lookout was on the 
bridge and was looking through binoculars. However, he 
did not identify the lights from the cardinal buoys mark-
ing the Varne Bank or report the sighting to the officer of 
the watch (OOW) (MAIB 2014b). A complacent behaviour 
contributed to 11% of the analysed accidents. 
Complacency nurtured by automation was one of the 
factors contributing to accident and involving the cargo 
vessel Rickmers Dubai, unmanned crane-barge Walcon 
Wizard and tug Kingston (MAIB 2014c). The collision hap-
pened while Rickmers Dubai was overtaking Kingston and 
Walcon Wizard due to Rickmers Dubai’s OOW, who did not 
notice Kingston and Walcon Wizard until it was too late 
to avoid a collision. Several facts indicated that OOW was 
relatively idle during his watch. The Rickmers Dubai was 
fitted with X-band radar and the radar targets of Kingston 
and Walcon Wizard were on display for almost one hour. 
However, OOW did not use ARPA or visual lookout to de-
termine if a risk of collision had existed. Therefore, it could 
be concluded that he was not monitoring the radar display 
or looking out of the window. Instead, he relied solely on 
the AIS information displayed on the ECDIS, ignoring in-
herent limitations of AIS which include the possibility 
that a complete picture of situation may not be obtained. 
Furthermore, the content of two safety broadcasts is-
sued by the Coastguard advising of Kingston and Walcon 
Wizard’s position passed unnoticed. Similarly, a compla-
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cent behaviour of OOW caused a grounding of the general 
cargo ship Douwent on Haisborough Sand in the North Sea 
(MAIB 2014d). In this case, he relied solely on the global 
positioning system (GPS) to monitor the vessel’s position 
and therefore he did not notice that Douwent departed 
from the intended route. Namely, the waypoint selected as 
the destination in the GPS receiver differed from those de-
tailed in the voyage plan. Furthermore, the ease of moni-
toring the information available from GPS contributed to 
a lack of stimulus which led to him falling asleep. The facts 
that he told to an able seaman that he was not required to 
remain on the bridge and that the bridge watch alarm was 
switched off indicated that he underestimated risks and 
ignored the need for following rules on bridge watchkeep-
ing practice.
5 Preventive measures
To determine appropriate preventive measures, a ho-
listic and systematic approach to safety is required (Kim et 
al. 2016). All components in complex socio-technical sys-
tems such as maritime transportation can have a role in 
promoting errors and accidents. Therefore, it is important 
to analyse all links in the human chain error, not only the 
mariners. Safety-critical decisions are also made on other 
levels: shipbuilding companies, ship-owning companies, 
classification societies, industry associations and govern-
ment regulatory authorities. 
An answer to the problem of poor ergonomics of 
equipment design is the application of user-centered 
design, in which the needs, wants and limitations of op-
erators are taken into account at each stage of the design 
process. Equipment designers should be completely fa-
miliar with all tasks performed by mariners in plenty of 
situations that can exist on board and around the ship in 
order to be able to design equipment which will coop-
erate with its human operator under all circumstances 
(Lutzhoft and Dekker 2002). Otherwise, maritime equip-
ment is designed for work-as-imagined not for work-as-
done which could lead to significant safety issues because 
there is a considerable difference between them even dur-
ing routine operations on board ships and particularly in 
unexpected or emergency situations. In addition to gen-
eral technology acceptance variables: perceived ease of 
use and usefulness, an impact of technology on decision 
performance (such as situation awareness, threat avoid-
ance, situation monitoring, voyage plan monitoring) and 
decision process (stress, confidence, satisfaction, mental 
and physical effort, vigilance and fatigue) should be con-
sidered in order to improve safety and aid human deci-
sion making (Dhami and Grabowski 2011). As technology 
becomes more complex and autonomous it is crucial to 
design it in a way that it complements humans and be-
comes an effective team player in order to avoid misas-
sessments and miscommunications (Lutzhoft and Dekker 
2002). A number of improvements in design can be made 
to sustain this task. For example, activities of automated 
systems should be observable, not just available and rep-
resentation of automation behaviour would have to be 
event-based, future-oriented and pattern-based. Because 
a ship is a specific working environment, a feedback from 
end-users is necessary to improve design. Therefore, it is 
important to stimulate all mariners to report possible is-
sues or problems with technology which occurred without 
consequences. All crew members should be involved in 
the process because users with different roles and respon-
sibility could experience significantly diverse technology 
impacts over time (Dhami and Grabowski 2011). 
One of the important steps to prevent the occurrence 
of accidents caused by insufficient level of knowledge 
of the own ship systems is the improvement of training. 
Generic and type specific trainings should focus not only 
on working knowledge of the functions of the automation 
in routine situations, but also in unusual or emergency 
situations. Furthermore, planning and deliverance of the 
training should take into account differences between at-
tendees involving not only previous knowledge and ex-
perience with technology, but also cultural influences 
and possible issues arising from the perception of ship 
organization as a strong hierarchical structure. A special 
attention should be paid to emphasizing capabilities and 
limitations of equipment in order to provide an under-
standing that it is necessary to get information from all 
available sources and to prevent a complacent behaviour. 
The usage of simulators during shore-based trainings can 
improve the seafarers’ complacency awareness and equip 
them with practical knowledge on the systems they will 
use on board. If simulators, used during trainings, exactly 
represent systems and equipment that seafarer will use 
on board, it will shorten the time needed for familiariza-
tion and enable on board teams to function efficiently even 
when a new member embarks on board a vessel. The ship-
ping companies should ensure that all instruction manuals 
as well as procedures and work instructions given in the 
safety management system correspond to actual equip-
ment on board and actions to be taken in emergency situ-
ations. Crews should be encouraged to report situation on 
board and ask for more precise instructions or more ade-
quate manuals from the company or equipment manufac-
turers. Equipment standardization would diminish hazard 
of poor design and reduce the length of the operator cross 
training between ship types. 
Effective teamwork is essential for optimizing safety 
on board vessels. Productive interactions among crew 
members can preclude accidents caused by deficiencies 
in technology design, inadequate familiarity with systems 
and overreliance on technology. However, traditional re-
lations on board ships with steep authority gradient may 
be difficult to overcome. For example, in the previously 
described case of Sirena Seaways the engineers noticed 
that back-up system was activated in time to prevent an 
accident, but they did not ask or inform the bridge team 
(MAIB 2014a). The master has the most important role 
to play to facilitate effective communications among crew 
members. Achieving and sustaining a positive safety cul-
ture is not possible if the master is not able to maintain 
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a balance between his authority and the crew members’ 
initiative. He has to consider reasonable challenges from 
crew members and acknowledge positively and explain 
his decisions during briefings to encourage crew mem-
bers to speak up if they spot an error. To motivate crew 
members to report equipment deficiencies, weaknesses in 
safety and/or near-misses, it is important to avoid attrib-
uting the blame whenever it is possible. Instead, the role 
of supplying safety-related information as useful preven-
tive measure should be emphasized. 
6 Conclusion
Despite the efforts of a global maritime community, 
maritime accidents caused by human error still occur. 
In order to reduce their number, it is vital to understand 
which human and organizational factors determine how 
the work on board a ship is carried out. Our analysis of 
the accident reports confirms that ineffective relation-
ship between human and technology remains one of the 
factors that contribute to the development of human er-
ror. Inadequately designed, baffling and insufficiently un-
derstood technology created error pathways that lead to 
accidents. On the other hand, perception of technology 
as fully reliable resulted in an inadequate crew members’ 
performance. 
To decrease the likelihood of an occurrence of human 
error related to technology, several actions are necessary. 
Because bridge standardization is a huge challenge and it 
will probably not happen in the near future, it is important 
to conduct trainings using same or very similar systems 
to those installed on board ships. Furthermore, a favour-
able learning environment should be created and all train-
ees should be encouraged to participate in confirming 
understanding and to be sure that training was effective. 
During delivering training courses, it is essential to accen-
tuate that human operator should use technological aid 
critically and obtain information from as many sources as 
possible. All crew members should provide safety-related 
information. To establish and maintain an effective safety 
culture, it is necessary to abandon old-established meth-
ods of ship organization and regard crew as a team with 
the master as a leader. 
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